Arab Nationalism in the Twentieth Century by Dawisha Adeed; Dawisha Adeed;

Author:Dawisha, Adeed; Dawisha, Adeed; [Dawisha, Adeed; Dawisha, Adeed;]
Language: eng
Format: epub
ISBN: 9780691169156
Publisher: PrincetonUP
Published: 2016-07-15T05:00:00+00:00

CHAPTER EIGHT

THE APEX OF ARAB NATIONALISM: THE UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC AND THE IRAQI REVOLUTION, JANUARY–SEPTEMBER 1958

The United Arab Republic (UAR), formed by the fusion of Egypt and Syria on February 1, 1958, came as a stunning surprise to most Arabs and non-Arabs. No one whose expectations were shaped by rational assessment could think that an organic unity between two Arab states was at all possible in such a short space of time. It was not the actual unity that was so surprising; Arab nationalists fervently believed in the eventual amalgamation of Arab countries. But no one (not even the main participants, as we shall see) was prepared for the breathless pace at which events were to unfold.

The Syrians, who demanded from Gamal ‘Abd al-Nasir, and ended up getting, an organic form of unity in 1958, had made earlier proposals for looser forms of union with Egypt. As early as the spring of 1955, ostensibly as a response to the Baghdad Pact, Khalid al-‘Azm, the then-prime minister of Syria, proposed the integration of the two armies, economic and financial cooperation between the two countries, and greater collaboration in foreign affairs.1 The Egyptians, it seems, were not ready to even contemplate such a proposal.2 Nor were the Egyptians more forthcoming in the summer of 1956 when the Syrians tried again to discuss unity.3 As late as the spring of 1957, Nasir told a Lebanese journalist, who was a fervent Arab nationalist, that any unity project among Arab states would be met with vigorous resistance by the British and the Americans, and even the Soviet Union might not be agreeable to such an idea.4 Nasir preached Arab nationalism and was cognizant of its ultimate goal, but obviously was enough of a realist to appreciate the many obstacles to its actual realization. And in any case, the balance of political power in the Arab world was firmly in favor of Nasir in the wake of the Suez Crisis, a balance of forces that saw Syria, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia allied with Egypt. Nasir had no reason to frighten off the Jordanian and Saudi monarchs by elevating “Arab unity” from the realm of aspirational rhetoric, where it had until then resided, into the sphere of actual policy making.

The momentum, however, began to change in the summer of 1957, a change brought about as much by external factors as internal ones. As the post-Suez Arab nationalist tide swept through every street, alley, and coffee shop in the Arab countries, and as Nasir appeared to be the sole custodian of the Arab nationalist mantle, using it at will to appeal to Arab mass opinion over the heads of their increasingly beleaguered governments, some of his political allies began to reassess their positions. This was especially true of the Saudi and Jordanian kings. King Saud had allied his country with Egypt against Iraq because of his family’s historical enmity to the Hashemites. After all, it was only after the expulsion of the Hashemites from al-Hejaz, that Saud’s father

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